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Independence and games
Denis Bonnay
IHPST / University of Paris I (France).
Résumé : La logique IF prétend constituer une alternative à la logique clas-
sique du premier ordre : en libéralisant les schémas de dépendance entre quan-
tificateurs, elle mènerait à leur terme les idées sous-jacentes à la logique clas-
sique. Mais les jeux de Hintikka ne constituent pas la seule manière possible de
fournir une sémantique pour l’indépendance : on pourrait au contraire vouloir
le faire dans le cadre d’une sémantique récursive avec des quantificateurs de
Henkin. Nous présentons ici quelques arguments techniques et philosophiques
en faveur de IF, en montrant pourquoi son concept d’indépendance, élargi
aux connecteurs, peut prétendre être pleinement général, et en montrant en
quel sens la logique IF traite l’indépendance de manière analytique. Ce dernier
point est réalisé à travers une explicitation du contenu épistémique de IF, sous
la forme d’une traduction partielle dans la logique modale.
Abstract: Hintikka and Sandu have developed IF logic as a genuine alter-
native to classical first-order logic: liberalizing dependence schemas between
quantifiers, IF would carry out all the ideas already underlying classical logic.
But they are alternatives to Hintikka’s game-theoretic approach; one could
use instead Henkin quantifiers. We will present here some arguments of both
technical and philosophical nature in favor of IF. We will show that its notion
of independence, once extended to connectives, can indeed claim to be fully
general, and that IF logic provides an analysis of independence patterns. This
last point will be argued for thanks to an explanation of the epistemic content
of IF, through a partial translation into modal logic.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 9 Cahier 2, 2005, 291–300.
1 Introduction
IF logic is a logic which extends first-order logic by removing res-
trictions on the possible dependence patterns between quantifiers. The
claim developed in [Hintikka 1996] according to which IF logic is the
classical logic is based on the idea that no more is required to unders-
tand IF logic than to understand FO logic. Once one has adopted a game
semantics, the liberalization of dependence patterns is very natural : it
corresponds to the shift from perfect to imperfect information games.
But one could as well use Henkin quantifiers to give a recursive seman-
tics for independence. Putting aside the partiality phenomena, which
could also be mimicked, the question cannot be settled on the level of
pure expressivity, and arguments are likely to boil down to the fact that
IF approach is more natural, elegant, or intuitive. We are going to try
to give some precise content to this feeling. Namely, we will discuss two
points : the claim of generality and the idea that IF gives a true analysis
of independence.We will make thus some technical points about the use
of slash and links with modal logic.
2 Defining information partitions
To begin with, we would like to examine the idea that IF logic is fully
general. Can the concept of independence apply freely to all connectives
and why could we say that, from this point of view, IF logic is as general
as it could be ? Let’s go back to the definition of semantic games.
In general, an extensive game is a 6-uplet 〈N,H,Z, J, P, (I)i∈N 〉 :
– N is the set of players
– H is the set of histories, i.e. a set of sequences containing the empty
sequence and which is closed by prefix
– Z ⊆ H is the set of terminal histories
– J is a function from H/Z to N which determines the players’ turn
to play
– P is the payoff function
– (I)i is a partition of {h ∈ H/J(h) = i}
A formula φ in normal form for negation and a model M define a
labeled game Gφ. N is {∀, ∃}. H is defined recursively together with J
and a labeling function l :
– <>∈ H, l(<>) = φ
– if h ∈ H and l(h)=ψ ∧ θ, then J(h) = ∀, h  L ∈ H, l(h  L) =
ψ, h  R ∈ H, and l(h  R) = θ
– if h ∈ H and l(h)=∃xψ, then J(h) = ∃, and for all a ∈ |M | , h 
a ∈ H, l(h  a) = ψ[x := a].
Z is the subset of H whose histories are labeled by an atomic formula.
P gives a terminal history h the value 1 or 0, according to the truth
or falsity of the atomic formula labelling h in the model.
If φ is a formula of classical logic, the information sets of the players
are trivially defined as the partition of J−1(∃/∀) consisting only of sin-
gletons. But the situation is not always so simple :
Problem 1. How does one define I∃ and I∀ when φ belongs to IF logic ?
The idea is that the players’ information partitions will be less fine-
grained ; two histories h and h’ belonging to the same information set
are so to say mixed up by the player so that for any strategy σ one
must have σ(h) = σ(h′). If one allows independence only with respect
to quantifiers, everything works well, but it is not so clear that one can
define independence in full generality, i.e. with respect to propositional
connectives as well. Two problems were raised by Sandu and van Ben-
them [van Benthem 2001] for the first one, and by Hodges [Hodges 1997]
for the second one :
1) meaningless syntactical possibilities, like in
Pa ∨
(
φ ∧/∨ ψ
)
Here the slash should tell that the second move by ∀bélard is inde-
pendent of ∃loïse’s choice for the disjunction. But what this should
mean is not very clear because ∀bélard must know she has chosen
the second disjunct as far as she knows she has to play.
2) counter-intuitive meaning of some sentences when independence is
defined with respect to the skolemization procedure, like in
∃x/∧φ(x) ∧ ∃x/∧ψ(x)
Here one would expect something equivalent to ∃x (φ(x) ∧ ψ(x)) :
∃loïse chooses an individual without knowing ∀bélard’s choice for
the conjunction. But the skolemization leads to
∃x1∃x2 (φ1(x) ∧ ψ2(x)) ,
where no meaningful independence can be plugged in.
Sandu (Independence-friendly languages, unpublished manuscript)
has suggested to overcome the problem by construing connectives as
quantifiers over formulas in Vaugth’s manner. We shall see this is unne-
cessary, because in order to solve the problem, it is sufficient to give a
good definition of the information partitions.
Let head/tail be a function giving the head/tail of a sequence, mc a
function giving the main connective of a formula and slash be a partial
function giving us for a history h the connectives of φ for which the main
connective of l(h) is slashed.
Definition 2. Given two histories h and h’ in H such that J(h) =
J(h′) = i and length(h)=length(h’), hRih
′ iff
for all initial segments s and s’ of same length of h and h’,
1. the types of mc(l(s)) and mc(l(s′)) are the same (slashes included)
2. either head(s) = head(s′) or mc(l(tail(s))) ∈ slash(h)
and mc(l(tail(s′))) ∈ slash(h′)
Condition 1. says that the histories should correspond to actions of
the same type and condition 2. says that if two actions are different, then
they should correspond to slashed connectives.
One can easily check that the Ri are equivalence relations leading
to information partitions which give a satisfactory interpretation to the
problematic occurrences of slashes. In the first case, we simply have no
independence at all, because condition 1. is not satisfied, and in the se-
cond case, both conditions will be satisfied at the critical nodes, so that
the truth-conditions of the formula are the intended ones. More gene-
rally, one could check that the information partitions are well defined
according to the usual game-theoretic criteria. So we have well-defined
games for independence with respect to connectives, without being com-
pelled to use tricks such as interpreting disjunction or conjunction as
quantification over formulas.
3 Generality
The main advantage of our previous definition is to pave the way for
an answer to the next question.
Problem 3. Could we have new information-defining operators like the
slash ?
The shift from classical logic to IF logic is obtained by adding a
new operator, the slash. Its semantic interpretation is totally different
from the usual connectives. Whereas they can be seen as game-forming
operators, the action of the slash does not modify the tree-structure
of the game but bears on the information-structure. As a consequence,
one could ask if the claim of Hintikka (bringing the ideas behing FO
quantification to their full generality by freeing oneself from arbitrary
syntactic limitations) is justified, that is if IF logic is fully general with
respect to arbitrary possible information-defining operators.
Let’s go back to condition 2., it says that a certain relation must hold
between subhistories, and which relation must hold depends on slash(h)
and slash(h’), that is on the information patterns allowed. We could
redefine a function slash(h, s) giving the information-defining operator
qualifying the main connective of l(h) with respect to the connective
prompting the action leading to the position s, and then condition 2.
would read :
head(s)RINDhead(s′)
with (IND = slash(h, head(s)) = slash(h′, head(s))). Information-defi-
ning operators are semantically interpreted as binary relations on mo-
dels (to be precise, as functions assigning to each model such a binary
relation). This is in the spirit of what happens in generalized quanti-
fier theory where for example unary quantifiers are seen as subsets of
the powerset of the models. Thus R/(M) is the universal relation on
|M | whereas Rblank(M) (corresponding to the absence of slash) is the
identity on |M | . For example, the formula ∀x∃y∃z/xφ(x, y, z) can be
construed as ∀x∃yblank(x)∃z/x,blank(y)φ(x, y, z).
So our question can be restated like this : what kind of binary re-
lations on models can behave like information defining operators for a
game-theoretic logic. The following conditions seem reasonable condi-
tions for any RIND :
Game-theoretic condition RIND(M) must be an equivalence rela-
tion on M . If this is not the case, the information sets induced by
RIND(M) will not form a partition of J
−1(i), but then it is no
more possible to say what a uniform strategy must be.
Logical condition As far as logic is expected to be topic-neutral,
RIND(M)must be closed under permutation on |M | (see Sher 1991
for a philosophical motivation in the context of generalized quan-
tifier theory) If this is not the case, RIND(M) will make some dis-
tinctions among objects in M, something a logical operator should
not do.
Semantic condition RIND must be homogenous, in the sense that it
should mean the same across models (exactly for the same reasons
for which we do not want a quantifier which would mean ∃ on
models of a given size and ∀ on models of other sizes).
Now, it is well known that there are only four binary relations satisfying
the logical condition, the universal relation, the empty re
and diversity. Only two out of these four, the universal relation and
identity, are equivalence relations. Then, by the semantic condition, we
require that RIND will be interpreted either by the universal relation on
all models, or by the identity on all models. So the answer to our second
question is yes :
Proposition 4. IF logic is as general as possible with respect to inde-
pendence patterns
This result obviously depends on the kind of generalizations we have
considered : we have established only that IF logic is fully general with
respect to independence operators, where independence operators are
binary relations on domains ruling the independence patterns essentially
between quantifier choices. One could devise other kind of extensions, for
example by adding a third player as [Pietarinen 2002] has proposed. Of
course this should be no surprise. But in these sort of cases, it would be
more difficult to defend the idea that the extension generalizes on ideas
already underlying classical FO-logic. On the contrary, one could argue
that this easy result shows indeed that full generality has been reached
relatively to the idea of arbitrary dependence patterns.
4 Analysis
Hintikka and Sandu [Hintikka & Sandu 1994] repeatedly argue against
the treatment of independence by means of Henkin quantifiers by poin-
ting out that Henkin quantifiers do not treat independence separately
but isolate blocks of quantifiers, whereas the game semantics provides a
step by step account of independence. In which respect does IF provide
a true analysis of the independence phenomena ? We have seen that this
is done by keeping a step by step construction of the games associated to
formulas while adding an information structure on the game. This means
that indepence is handled by restricting the knowledge of the players.
Problem 5. Can one give a formal account of the epistemic content of
IF logic ?
One could imagine two kinds of reductions of IF sentences to episte-
mic sentences.
– a full reduction Given an IF sentence φ and a model M, we give an
epistemic sentence φ’, build from F and an epistemic model M’,
build from M such that M  φ iff M ′  φ′.
– a partial reduction One only tries to isolate the epistemic content
of IF sentences.
I think that the second approach is both more manageable and more
meaningful, sticking to the idea that the shift from FO logic to IF logic
corresponds to the addition of epistemic constraints.
Given an IF formula φ and a model A, we seek :
– a classical formula φ∗, φ classical counterpart.
– a Kripke structure M, describing the game Gφ,A.
– an epistemic sentence ψi describing the knowledge needed to win
for the player i.
such that φ∗,M and ψi, built from φ and A satisfy :
A i φ iff
[
A i φ∗ and M  ψi
]
where i means the existence of a winning for i.
The proof is rather simple, let’s give the ideas first. φ∗ is simply ob-
tained from φ by dropping the slashes. In the spirit of [van Benthem
200 ?], 1 the Kripke structure M is simply the game tree Gφ,M , the ac-
cessibilty relations corresponding to the equivalence relations induced by
the information partitions, the atoms of the propositionnal modal lan-
guage are just names for the nodes of the tree, valuated the intuitive
way.
A bit more technical is the design of ψi. The idea is that ψi expresses
the knowledge needed to win, when M expresses the knowledge actually
possessed by the players. As a consequence, ψi will be valid on M if the
knowdelge granted to the player i in the imperfect game corresponding
to φ is enough for i to have a winning strategy on Gφ,M . ψi is obtained
through variation of the information partitions granted to i in Gφ,M ,
suitably filtered to simplify ψi. We shall note that ψi will require use
of infinite conjunctions and disjunctions when Gφ,M is itself infinite. To
get things simpler, we will suppose that Gφ,M is finite (the extension to
the infinite case is straightforward through the shift to infinitary propo-
sitionnal modal logic).
To begin with, we explain how to construct ψi. Let P be a partition of
a set, we denote byRP the equivalence relation induced by that partition.
We define the set of the alternative information structure for the player
i :
IPi = {P / P is a partition of J
−1({i}) and for all h,h’∈ H, hRph
′
implies length(h)=length(h’)}
1. [van Benthem 2002] and [van Benthem 200 ?] offer a much wider application
of modal logic to the analysis of extensive games ; the result we present in this sec-
tion stems out of a much more modest project, namely to make clear the epistemic
component of IF logic.
This gives a family Gi of games which differ of G only on Ii :
Gi = {G
′ / there is a P ∈ IPi such that G
′ = G[P/Ii]}
Among all these alternative information structures, one can distinguish
the winning ones :
WIPi = {P ∈ IPi / there is a winning strategy for player i on
Gp = G[P/Ii]}
It is possible to work a bit on WIPi to reduce its size, although
this is not essential for the proof. One could focus on minimal winning
partitions, in the following sense of minimal. Let P, P ′ ∈ WIPi, P  P
′
iffdef ∀h, h
′ ∈ H, hRP ′h
′ → hRPh
′. Intuitively,  means ’less fine-
grained than’. It is very easy to check that  is an ordering on WIPi.
In the general case,  is not a total order. We can then restrict ourself
to the minimal winning information partitions for i :
MWIPi = {P ∈ WIPi / P is  −minimal on WIPi}
We can note that they are two distinguished partitions, P ∗ in which
all the histories of the same depth are mixed up, and P ∗∗ which consist
only in singletons. If we see  as an order on Ii, P
∗ and P ∗∗ are res-
pectively the smallest and the greatest elements. But there might be no
smallest element inWIPi ; this is the case if there is no winning strategy
for player i on P ∗.
Let P0...Pn be the partitions in WIPi and h0...hz the histories in H.
Let L be the modal propositional language whose atoms are h0...hz. Let
k be an integer no greater than n. If 0 ≤ l,m ≤ z, we define
Fl,m ≡def (Ki ∼ hl) ∨ (Ki ∼ hm)
and given Γk = {Fl,m / 0 ≤ l,m ≤ z and ∼ hlRPkhm}, we shall denote
by θk the conjunction of the formulas in Γk. It could be possible to
decrease the size of Γk using tautologies of the propositionnal calculus.
The idea behind this construction is that θk is a description of Pk in
so far as it tells us between which situations the player i can distinguish
when its information structure is given by Pk. Intuitively, to know that
∼ hl or to know that ∼ hm is intended to mean being able to distinguish
between the two positions hl and hm.
We can now define ψi :
ψi ≡ ∨
0≤k≤n
θk if WIPi is not empty and ⊤ if WIPi is empty.
As we said before, the definition of the Kripke structure M is quite
natural. The set H of histories is the domain on which the accesibility
relation Ri is the equivalence relation induced by Ii.We have to evaluate
the atoms h0...hz, this is done by putting simply hi ∈ V al(hj) iff i = j.
Let’s check that
Proposition 6. A i φ iff
[
A i φ∗ and M  ψi
]
We shall show first that Pk  Ii iff M  θk.
– Pk  Ii impliesM  θk. Assume Pk  Ii and let Fl,m be one of the
conjuncts of θk. By construction of θk, this means that ∼ hlRkhm.
As Pk  Ii, we have also ∼ hlRihm. It follows that M  Fl,m : let
h be any history. Suppose that M,h  Fl,m This means that both
hl and hm are Ri-accessible from h, but as Ri is an equivalence
relation, this implies that hl and hm are themselves Ri-related,
which gives us a contradiction.
– M  θk implies Pk  Ii. Assume M  θk. Let hl and hm be any
histories such that ∼ hlRkhm, we show that we have ∼ hlRihm
as well. By hypothesis, M  (Ki ∼ hl) ∨ (Ki ∼ hm) . Assume that
hlRihm. We have then M,hl  (Ki ∼ hl) ∨ (Ki ∼ hm) because
M,hl  hl and M,hm  hm, which gives us a contradiction.
The desired result follows :
– A i φ implies
[
A i φ∗ and M  ψi
]
. It is quite obvious that A i
φ implies A i φ∗. And if A i φ, we have that Ii ∈WIPi, so that
there is a Pk ∈ MWIPi such that Pk  Ii. We have then M  θk
and M  ψi.
–
[
A i φ∗ and M  ψi
]
implies A i φ. As A i φ∗, ψi is different
from ⊤. This means that there is a k such that M  θk. So there
is a Pk ∈ MWIPi such that Pk  Ii for which the player i has a
winning strategy. It follows straightforwardly that i has a winning
strategy on G. Intuitively, if i can win with a certain amount of
information, he can win as well with less information, the winning
strategy for Ii being directly obtained from the one for Pk.
This result exactly gives what we were looking for : the existence of
a winning strategy on the imperfect information game can be analysed
in the existence of a winning strategy on the corresponding perfect in-
formation game plus additional knowledge. We may say that IF logic is
implicitly epistemic, that our construction makes this epistemic content
explicit, and that this gives a precise account of the way IF logic deals
with independence.
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